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INTHE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

IRA ROYAL L. TRIBE, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vsSALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
13856

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
AND RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to
determine constitutionality of the Utah Neighborhood
Development Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 1119-1 et seq (1973), and of actions taken and proposed
to be taken by the Defendants and Respondents pursuant to such act and to determine the proper interpretation of certain provisions of such act.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The trial court, sitting without a jury, was presented documentary and testimonial evidence and
entered declaratory judgment as prayed in the counterclaim of Defendants and Respondents holding that the
Utah Neighborhood Development Act (hereinafter referred to as "The Act") is constitutional and that certain resolutions of certain of the Defendants are lawful
and valid, including resolutions approving a plan for
the issuance of bonds by the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency ("Redevelopment Agency or Agency")
for the payment of which certain parking revenues and
"tax increments" are pledged. (R. 98-100).
R E L I E F SOUGHT BY A P P E L L A N T S
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the
trial court and a declaration that the Act and the activities undertaken and proposed by the Respondents pursuant thereto are violative of both state and federal law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents concur with the Appellants' statement of facts but supplement and amplify them with
the following:
The project area in which the proposed parking
facility is situated, was in a deteriorating blighted condition when it was selected for improvement under the
Redevelopment Agency plan. (R. 127, Exhibits 7 and
8). The area required significantly more expenditure of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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city funds than were generated by taxes assessed and levied upon the real property in the area. (R. 152,180). Almost all of the buildings were non-inhabitable above the
ground floor (R. 127, 172) and the assessed valuation
decreased steadily from 1969 to 1973 during a period
of spiraling inflation (Exhibit 18 found at R. 87).
Were it not for the action taken and proposed to be
taken by the Respondents, the area was and is doomed
to further deterioration with the resulting adverse economic impact upon the City and its taxpayers. (R. 180181). The blighted neighborhood with its attendant
crime, health and economic problems could not attract
suitable development by private industry without areawide rehabilitation and the construction of needed parking facilities. (R. 172-173 and Exhibit 4). Implementation of all aspects of the proposed plan will increase
assessed valuations by an estimated 6.4 to 9.8 million
dollars by reason of market values of improvements
ranging from an estimated 32 million dollars to approximately 49 million dollars. (Exhibit 13). All of this
increase will be accomplished without cost to the City,
Salt Lake County, or the State of Utah. Sales tax
revenues collected by the state will be increased dramatically. Existing facilities such as the civic center
may be used more efficiently and other development by
private businesses in the state will be facilitated. The
state tourism industry will benefit from the convenience
of available parking near major tourist attractions and
more and bigger conventions can be scheduled with the
availability of the facilities to be developed within the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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project area. Thus the parking structure to be financed
with the tax allocation and parking revenue bond issue
will have an economic multiplier effect with statewide
impact. (R. 151-152). (Concerning the matters generally
set out in this paragraph, see also paragraphs 9 and 10
of the Findings of Fact of the trial court, R. 93-94.)
Revenues from the tax increment portion of the
assessed valuation increase may be allocated for use by
the Redevelopment Agency only until such time as the
loans, advances and indebtedness or any interest thereon incurred by the Agency have been paid. Pursuant
to Section 11-19-25 (1) (b), all monies thereafter received
from taxes upon the taxable property in the redevelopment project shall be paid into the funds of the respective taxing agencies in the same manner as taxes on all
other property. (See also R. 169). Thus the proposed
plan and the underlying enabling legislation contemplate a source of increased tax revenue for taxing entities such as the state, county, school districts, and city.
But these entities will not be required to contribute to
the cost of improving the project area in accordance
with the redevelopment plan.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE CREATION AND OPERATION
OF THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY UNDER THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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VELOPMENT ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 28 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHICH PROHIBITS DELEGATION TO A SPECIAL COMMISSION
OF THE POWER TO MAKE, SUPERVISE
OR INTERFERE WITH A MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT OR TO PERFORM MUNICH
AL FUNCTIONS.
The intended purpose of the Section 28 constitutional provision (commonly referred to as the "Ripper
Clause") is to preclude the improper imposition of state
legislative directives on municipalities. See Porter,
"Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law: An Early
Urban Experiment," Utah Law Review, (Part I )
April, 1969 page 287 and (Part I I ) June, 1969 page
450. These problems as well as the express constitutional
prohibition are avoided by the proposed redevelopment
plan.
A. There is no Legislative Delegation to the Redevelopment Agency Because the Agency was Voluntarily Created by the City.
The Redevelopment Agency was created by an
ordinance adopted by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City—not by a state legislative enactment.
The Utah Neighborhood Development Act leaves the
formation of a redevelopment agency and the implementation of any redevelopment plans entirely to the discretion of the legislative bodies of communities. By allowDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ft
ing the cities to elect whether or not to take advantage
of the state legislation allowing the creation of redevelopment agencies, the legislature has anticipated the
local control of such agencies and it has avoided interference with the self-control by municipalities of municipal functions.
This pirnciple was recognized by the Utah Supreme
Court in a decision in which Justice Crockett, in speaking for a unanimous court, rejected the argument propounded on behalf of the State Water Pollution Control Board that its interference with municipal functions was analogous to that of a metropolitan water
district. The court pointed out the "cases are clearly
distinguishable in that the Metropolitan Water District was initiated by the cities desiring the district and
there was no direct delegation by the legislature to a
board or agency which would allow it to interfere with
any municipal improvement, property, or function".
State Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah
2d 247, 311 P.2d 370, 376 (1957).
We acknowledge the consistency of this court in
striking down legislation under which authority has
been delegated to state agencies to perform or interfere
directly with municipal functions. But local option legislation avoids this problem. In three of the five cases
cited on page 14 of Appellants' brief, this court approved statutes allowing local electors to create public
entities for the creation of a metropolitan water district,
Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935);
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a sewer and water district Tygesen v. Magna Water
Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127 (1950); and a special
service district for construction of a swimming pool,
Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, 23
Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814 (1969). The remaining cases
are not in point because they were decided on grounds
other than improper delegation. Dictum in Backman v.
Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412,375 P.2d 756 (1962)
discusses the delegation issue and refers to what is now
Article VI, Section 28 of the Constitution, but that
case turned on the failure of Salt Lake County to initiate a bond election at the time and in the manner called
for under the Act. I n a subsequent case this court expressly refused to follow the dictum of the Backman
case and the majority opinions limited the Backman
holding to the bond election issue. Branch v. Salt Lake
County Service Area No. 2, supra. The majority opinions in the Branch case also caution against an unduly
broad interpretation of Carter v. Beaver County Service
Area No. 1,16 Utah 280, 399 P.2d 440 (1965), in which
the objectionable features of the County Service Area
Act were its vagueness and the attempted authorization
of "an unlimited number of activities". Since the Carter
and Backman cases were decided for reasons other than
the local option issue, it was apparent to the trial court
that the position of this court as stated in State
Water Pollution Board v. Salt Lake City, supra, remains unchanged so that there is not an unconstitutional
legislative delegation where enabling statutes cannot be
implemented without affirmative action of local entities.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Well reasoned opinions from neighboring jurisdictions have also found lack of delegation where local
option is granted. The California Supreme Court in
City of Whittier v. Dickson, 24 Cal.2d 665, 151 P.2d
5 (1944) rejected a challenge that creation of a parking district pursuant to state statutory authorization
violated a California constitutional provision prohibiting
the delegation of any municipal function to a special
commission. I n so holding the court noted, "The parking place commissioners, however, are city officers appointed by the legislative body of the city when it elects
to acquire parking places under the act, and are removable at the pleasure of that body. I t is the local governing body and not the Legislature that confers upon
the commission the right to exercise its functions." (151
P.2d at 7). I n a similar case the Colorado Supreme
Court found absence of imposition of legislative fiat
upon the populace affected and compliance to the fullest extent with the principles of local self-government
in the creation of a sanitation district by local electors
pursuant to enabling legislation. City of Aurora v.
Aurora Sanitation District, 122 Col. 407, 149 P.2d 662
(1944). See also Housing Authority v. Dockweiler, 14
Cal.2d 37, 94 P.2d 794 (1939).
Pennsylvania, which provided the constitutional
model for Utah and other states by being the first to
amend its constitution to include the so-called "Ripper
Clause" has a constitutional provision substantially
identical to Article VI, Section 28. In Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(1947) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court approved an
urban development authority because final decisions
about the scope and substance of redevelopment projects were reserved to local elected officers. The earlier
Pennsylvania case of Lighton v. Abington Township,
336 Pa. 345, 9 A.2d 609 (1939), can be distinguished
from the Belovsky case because Lighton dealt with a
delegation of municipal authority to a private corporation, an act which was repugnant to both state and municipal law. I t is apparent that Pennsylvania is in accord with the California and Colorado Supreme Courts.
B. There
gation Because
ers of the City
Commissioners

is no Unconstitutional Legislative DeleMembers of the Board of Commissionare the only Members of the Board of
of the Redevelopment Agency.

The Utah Legislature also reserved to municipalities control over their redevelopment agencies by providing that if one were formed pursuant to the exercise
of local option, the legislative body of the community
would designate itself as the legislative body of the
agency. I t is obvious that there can be no delegation of
municipal administrative authority by the legislature
through the city to a redevelopment agency where both
the agency and the city are managed by the same municipal legislative body. I t is equally clear that the possible
evils complained of in the Backman case, supra; i.e.,
legislative interference with municipal functions, diminution of local self-control and the imposition of an intermediate level of non-representative government, are
entirely avoided where the Board of Commissioners of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the City also administers the Agency. If the practices
and policies of the Board of Commissioners of the Redevelopment Agency are unsatisfactory to the city electorate, new commissioners will be elected to replace the
incumbents,
C. The Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
is Not A Special Commission, Private Corporation or
Association Improperly Managing, Supervising or Interfering With Any Municipal Improvement or Performing any Municipal Functions Within the Meaning
of Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution.
Although the Redevelopment Agency is administered and managed by the legislative body of Salt
Lake City, its operations are separate and distinguishable from those of the City. One of the Appellants' alternative arguments is that operational differences and
separateness establish the Redevelopment Agency as a
special commission. The existence of a legal entity separate from that of a municipality is not by itself determinitive of the status of "special commission", nor is it
illegal under the proper circumstances for that separate
legal entity to perform certain functions which cities
are empowered to perform. See for example, Branch v.
Salt Lake City Service Area No. 2, supra, where this
court approved the creation of a special service area for
purposes including the construction of a swimming pool
in an area where similar facilities were not available
despite the inherent authority of the county to construct
a swimming pool; Barlow v. Clearfield City Corp., 1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Utah 2d 419, 268 P.2d 682 (1954) wherein a city was
not prohibited from contracting with a separate entity,
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, for services
which the city was empowered to perform itself; and
Lehi City v. Meiling, supra, in which the validity of a
separate water district was upheld even though the City
of Lehi and other cities in the district had authority to
establish, operate and maintain a water system. Clearly
the holding of this court in the Lehi City case, supra,
that a water district does not come within the constitutional designation "special commission, private corporation or association" (48 P.2d at 535), also applies to
the Redevelopment Agency which is merely a "public
agency or entity created for beneficial and necessary
public purposes". (48 P.2d at 541). See also Freeman v.
Stewart, 2 Utah 2d 319, 273 P.2d 174 (1954); and
Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 106
Utah 55,145 P.2d 503 (1944).
I t is acknowledged that the holdings of the above
cited cases do not justify a position that any separate
commission may be empowered to perform municipal
functions. But in the case at bar there is a total absence
of any objectionable impingement upon municipal control and functions. The Redevelopment Agency cannot
impose or levy a tax nor can it interfere with the administration of the internal affairs of the City. The
allocation of tax increment revenues does not affect the
mill levy imposed by taxing units. The City maintains
absolute control of the Agency through its Board of
Commissioners and coordination of the separate funcDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tions of the two entities can be maintained effectively.
The City will continue to possess and exercise every
municipal function it now has. The Utah Neighborhood
Development Act contemplates cooperation between
cities and their redevelopment agencies—not interference with municipal functions.
Appellants contend the interruption of street
traffic flow which may be experienced during the construction phase of the proposed Redevelopment Agency
plan constitutes interference with the municipal functions contemplated by Article VI, Section 28. The essential construction tasks incident to improving,
refurbishing and constructing structures in urban areas
whether publicly or privately owned will ordinarily
cause temporary inconveniences such as detours for pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Such matters are inconsequential when compared with the interference which
is prohibited by the constitution as a usurpation of the
political power inherent in the electors residing in a
municipality. This Court defined the nature and scope
of prohibited state interference in the early case of
Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah
536, 271 P . 961 (1928) when it said in connection with
what is now Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution, "We think it clear that the undoubted purpose
of the constitutional provision is to hold inviolate the
right of local self-government of cities and towns with
respect to municipal improvements, money, property,
effects, the levying of taxes, and the performance of
municipal functions . . ." (271 P . at 972).
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A final aspect of the delegation issue involves the
so-called "state purpose doctrine". I n cases involving
direct state agency intervention with municipal activities the court has properly looked for a justifiable state
interest requiring protection. For example, the attempted regulation of Salt Lake City sewage disposal facilities by the State Water Pollution Control Board would
not have been an unlawful interference with a municipal
function if there would have been a showing that the
city was causing a menace to the health and safety of
other state residents. State Water Pollution Board v.
Salt Lake City, supra. Under this rationale it could be
said the state agency must protect a state interest rather
than merely perform a municipal function. Appellants
argue for the extension of the requirement of state purpose into the local option area of municipal law relying
on dictum in Backman v. Salt Lake County, supra, and
the dissenting opinions in Branch v. Salt Lake Cotmty
Service Area No. 2, supra. The incongruous result is
that water, sewer and swimming pools involve overriding state purposes but civic centers and hospitals do not.
Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2, supra,
(swimming pool); Backman v. Salt Lake County,
supra, (civic center); and Carter v. Beaver County
Service Area No. 1, supra, (hospital). We submit that
the interpretation urged upon the court by Appellants
is unnecessarily confusing. As was pointed out, both
the Backman and Carter cases were decided on issues
which are unrelated to the questions raised in this case.
The court decided the Branch case by recognizing sigDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nificant public needs without specific reference in the
majority opinions to state purposes. David O. Porter
summarized and reconciled Utah and other "Ripper
Clause" delegation cases without mention of the state
purpose doctrine by emphasizing the following basic but
not mutually exclusive principles, "(1) the legislature
cannot delegate to an elected municipal body; (2) the
legislature may not delegate the taxing power except
to such an elective body on the ground that "taxation
without representation is tyranny"; and (3) local governments are inherently better suited than the state legislature to determine the scope and depth of their activities and services". (Porter, supra, at 481). Respondents
respectfully submit that the proposed Redevelopment
Agency project avoids the constitutional prohibitions
enunciated by this court and summarized by Mr. Porter.
If the court elects to apply the state purpose test,
it should find, as did the trial court, that the subject
Redevelopment Agency plan has significant state-wide
impact. "The public evils, social and economic, of conditions of slum areas in large cities are matters of state
concern, since they vitally affect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public . . ." 26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain, § 42 (1966) and cases therein cited. The record
abundantly supports a finding of state purposes. For
example, sales tax revenues will be sharply increased,
the state tourism industry will be expanded and the
project will have a multiplier effect on the economy of
the state. (R. 151-152). The problems relating to urban
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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blight which affect the entire state and nation are proper
subjects for state legislative attention. "[Substandard, decadent, or blighted areas . . . constitute a serious
and growing menace injurious and inimical to the safety, health, morals, and welfare of the people throughout the United States." Annot. 45 A.L.R. 3d 1096 at
1100 (1972). The proposed parking facility is an essential part of an integrated plan to rehabilitate some of the
most blighted slum areas in the state. The court has
not been called upon previously to determine whether
the objectives of redevelopment involve significant state
interest rather than purely local functions. Other states
with constitutional provisions comparable to Utah's
Article VI, Section 28 have properly held that redevelopment activities are functions justifying state legislation. In re Bunker Hill Renewal Project IB, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 74, 389 P.2d 538 (1964); Fellom v. Redevelopment Agency, 157 Cal.App.2d 243, 320 P.2d 884
(1958); Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114 (Colo.
1961); People v. Newton, 101 P.2d 21 (Colo. 1940);
Romano v. Housing Authority of the City of Newark,
123 N . J . L . 428, 10 A.2d 181 (1939), and the companion case of Kantor v. City of Perth Amboy, 123 N.J.L.
504, 10 A.2d 184 (1939). These cases are in point despite semantic differences in the constitutions of the respective states. W e cannot agree with the assertion of
Appellants that "in California the authority for redevelopment agencies to act is established by a state constitutional provision" (Appellants' Brief p. 20). The
section of the California Constitution cited by AppelDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lants, Article X I I I , Section 19 which is now Article
X V I , Section 16, is a part of an article concerning
revenue and taxation. It applies to the allocation of tax revenues generated from redevelopment
project areas. I n California as in Utah there is no express constitutional provision establishing redevelopment agencies or comparable public entities, but the
California Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of redevelopment activities as will be set out more
fully hereafter.
The argument by Appellants that the City had
authority to control the problems which led to the existence of the blighted central city project area does not
square with the facts. The use of the traditional city
powers of zoning, law enforcement, declaring and abating nuisances, controlling structures under building,
fire and sanitation codes and even the existence of the
power to acquire and dispose of property did not solve
the problems. The obvious legislative intent of the Utah
Neighborhood Development Act was to provide appropriate statutory opportunity for cities and counties to
create agencies with unique capacity to qualify for federal financing and to coordinate private with public development. (R. 176). By this means different programs
have been initiated to achieve solutions in areas where
the city historically has been notably unsuccessful. See
Sundby, "The Elimination and Prevention of Urban
Blight", 1959 Wis.LMev. 73; and Note, "The Concepts of Urban Renewal", 37 So. Cal.L.Rev. 55 (1964)
in which a variety of redevelopment devises and sources
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of financing are explained and information concerning
typical project areas before and after redevelopment
is furnished.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD
THAT THE PROPOSED REDEVELOPMENT
AGENCY BONDS DO NOT CONSTITUTE
A DEBT OF THE CITY WITHIN THE
MEANING OF UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XIV, SECTIONS 3 AND 4.
The City would not exceed its debt limit if an additional $15,000,000.00 of bonds were issued as general
obligation indebtedness of Salt Lake City (See Exhibit
17). But the trial court's finding that the proposed Redevelopment Bonds cannot constitute a debt of the City
should be affirmed so as to avoid the unnecessary reduction of available debt capacity and for the following
additional reasons:
A. The Redevelopment Agency is an independent
"quasi-municipal" corporation and/or a "special district and not the City nor a department, division or
subdivision thereof.
Appellants on appeal continue the inconsistent arguments which were initiated in their amended complaint concerning the status of the Redevelopment
Agency. As to the Article V I delegation issue they contend the Agency is a separate entity, but as to the Article X I V debt issue they argue the two have a single
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Iffidentity so that the agency is merely a department or
subdivision of the City. While perpetuation of this inconsistency into the appeal phase of this litigation is
procedurally correct, it evidences a critical weakness in
Appellants' position. This dilemma was entirely avoided
by the trial court when it determined as a matter of
both fact and law that the Agency is a separate legal
entity administered by the same municipal legislative
body. (Findings of Fact, 8, 12, 13 and 14 at R. 93-95
and Conclusions of Law 3 and 4 at R. 98-99).
Contrary to the contention of Appellants, the absence in the Utah Neighborhood Development Act of
a preamble-type legislative acknowledgment of the
independence of the Agency is not controlling. The
essential elements of the separate legal existence of the
Agency are set out in the Act making an express legislative finding or declaration superfluous. Section 11-1923.1 in describing the powers of the public body (the
City in this instance) authorizes cooperation in redevelopment projects to which end the City may among
other things: "(1) Dedicate, sell, convey or lease any
of its property to a redevelopment a g e n c y ; . . . (8) purchase and buy or otherwise acquire land in a project
area from an agency for redevelopment in accordance
with the plan . . .". In addition, Section 11-19-23.12
allows the agency to acquire property of the City
through eminent domain with the consent of the City.
Such authorization would not be necessary if the Redevelopment Agency were a department or subdivision
of the City. Furthermore, the Act authorizes the creaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tion of redevelopment agencies with power to transact
business (11-19-3), borrow money, implement project
plans (11-19-13), acquire by purchase, lease, option or
by other means real and personal property (11-1923.9(1)) and to acquire real property by eminent domain (11-19-23.9(2)); to sell, convey, lease or otherwise
dispose of property (11-19-22) and to issue bonds
(11-19-23.2 and 11-19-25). All of the above powers are
to be exercised in the name of the respective redevelopment agency.
The operations of the Agency are definitely separate from those of the City and the City has treated and
dealt with the Agency as a separate entity. Employees
of the Agency are not paid by the City and they do not
qualify for tenure or other City employment benefits.
(R. 174, 178). The Agency maintains separate offices, and pays its own rent. It keeps separate accounting records and handles its own funds which are maintained in a separate bank account under the sole control of the Agency (R. 178). Its fiscal years have been
entirely different than those of the City. It has a separate budget. (See Exhibit 9). The Agency has borrowed funds in its own name by issuing promissory
notes which have expressly negated any obligation or
liability against the City. (Exhibits 15 and 16). It has
obtained million of dollars in loans and grants which
would not have been available to the City. (R. 176),
The agency retains and pays for its own independent
professional advisors. (R. 178).
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This court has firmly established the distinction
between quasi-municipal corporations or special districts
and cities, towns, counties, school districts and other
true municipal corporations. Lehi City v. Meiling,
supra, is much cited for its holding that a metropolitan
water district serving five communities was a quasimunicipal corporation to which debt limitation did not
apply. But the companion case of Provo City v. Evans,
87 Utah 292, 48 P.2d 555 (1935), which was handed
down at the same time as the Lehi City case is equally
important because it adopted the Lehi City majority
opinion by reference and applied it to a metropolitan
water district that was coterminous with the city boundaries of Provo. Other cases upholding the special district concept are Freeman v. Stewart, supra; Tygesen
v. Magna Water Co., supra; and Patterick v. Carbon
County Water Conservancy District, supra. Perhaps
the rationale of the above cases can best be summarized
by a portion of an instructive opinion of this court in
the case of Barlow v. Clearfield City Corp., supra, involving a water district with the same boundaries as
Clearfield City and a contractual arrangement between
the City and the district under which the City would
distribute the water for the district and collect revenues
from water users. In rejecting an argument of identity
between the district and the City this court held in part,
"The City and the District are two separate and distinct entities organized generally for separate and distinct purposes but whose purposes converge and cover
some of the same objectives. Sometimes the purposes
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of one dovetail and coordinate with those of the other.
. . . So we hold that this is an obligation of the District
and not a debt of the city". (268 P.2d at 687).
The possibility of creating an entity with formal
appearance of a quasi-municipal corporation but without any substantial purpose is conceded. To such entities
the warning of circumvention of debt limits sounded
in Backman v. Salt Lake County, supra, is appropos.
But it should be apparent that the Redevelopment
Agency was not created merely to expand the bonding
capacity of the City. The Agency has no taxing power
I t anticipates no revenue from the City in connection
with the proposed parking facility (R. 152), but if it
received any such revenues they could not be used to repay the proposed $15,000,000.00 bond issue ( 11-19^ST5^3ddb&). Respondents emphasize that Agency purposes
and objectives are both substantial and separate from
those of the City.
Neither the Backman case nor Carter v. Beaver
County Service Area No. 1, upra, should be interpreted
as a limitation or restriction of the special district doctrine established and consistently upheld by this court.
Fortunately Justice Ellett on behalf of a majority of
this court, explained the holdings of both the Backman
and Carter cases. In Branch v. Salt Lake
County
Service Area No. 2, supra. While applying again the
special district doctrine the court said, "In the Carter
case this court thought the services permissible under the
act were too many, and the Legislature attempted to
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and did correct the defect by its 1967 amendment . . ."
(460 P.2d at 815). I t also limited Backman to a finding of noncompliance with election procedures. The special district concept continues to be a vital, clearly defined part of the common law of the state of Utah. By
application of this principal the conclusion is inescapable
that even if the Agency were empowered to incur debt
by issuing bonds to be repaid by proceeds from a special
tax levied upon residents of Salt Lake City, this would
not result in "debt" as that word is applied by the Utah
Constitution to cities, counties, towns or school districts.
B. The Redevelopment bonds will not constitute
debt of the City because they are to be repaid from a
special fund.
If the Agency is held to be a division of the City
rather than a separate quasi-municipal corporation or a
special district, then the proposed bonds will not constitute a debt of the City because they are to be repaid
from a special fund. A pledge to repay bonded indebtedness together with accrued interest from an identifiable fund separate from the general fund of the municipality does not create debt in the constitutional sense
under the special fund doctrine which was established
by Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321,279 P . 878 (1929).
See Note, "Constitutional Restrictions Upon Municipal
Indebtedness", 1966 Utah Law Review, 462, 471-478.
Appellants concede that the pledge of revenues
to be generated by the proposed parking facility comes
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within the special fund doctrine. However, as to the
tax allocation portion of the revenue sources for repayment of the bonds, Appellants contend a debt is created
by reason of a much criticized limitation purportedly
arising from the holding of Fjeldsted v. Ogden City,
83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933). (For criticism of the
Fjeldsted type limitation on the special fund exception
see Williams and Nehemkis, "Municipal Improvements
as Affected by Constitutional Debt Limitations", 37
Colum. L.Rev. 177 (1937), which was cited by this
court with approval in Conder v. University of Utah,
123 Utah 182, 187-88, 257 P.2d 367, 370-71 (1953)).
Because it appears Appellants have misinterpreted the
the ruling of Fjeldsted it may be helpful to outline the
facts as well as the decision reached in that case. For
a period of six years prior to the filing of a petition by
Mr. Fjeldsted the net surplus from operation of the
Ogden waterworks system was paid into the general
fund. When it became necessary to construct an additional reservoir, build a conduit pipeline from artesian
wells in Ogden canyon to the city, install various pipeline replacements and purchase and install water
meters, the City proposed to pledge its waterworks
revenues as repayment of $645,000.00 water revenue
bonds. There was an express finding based on an admission of the City that the "proposed improvements
will afford no new source of revenue" (28 P.2d at 149).
Reasoning that the proposed pledge of the waterworks
surplus as security for the waterworks revenue bonds
would eliminate a source of revenue to the general fund
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which would have to be replaced by additional real property taxes, a majority of the court held that the Barnes
v. Lehi City, supra, special fund doctrine must be
limited in Fjeldsted type situations where an actual diversion from the general fund is required thereby increasing the burden on the general taxpayer. Two
justices joined in a vigorous dissent pointing out among
other things that the majority had departed from the
great weight of authority.
By disregarding the actual termination of the payment by Ogden City of surplus waterworks revenues
into the general fund and by speculating about increased operation and maintenance costs. Appellants
urge the conclusion that the Fjeldsted court was dealing merely with the possibility of future diversion from
the general fund. W e cannot agree with this interpretation and it is respectfully submitted that this court has
previously rejected a similar challenge. Utah Power
and Light Company v. Ogden City, 95 Utah 161, 79
P.2d 61, 67 (1938). The indirect "feeding" of the special fund from the general fund was allowed in Utah
Power and Light Company v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203,
74 P.2d 1191 (1937) in which Provo City was authorized to pay into the district utility bond special fund the
reasonable value of electricity used by the City. Obviously the Fjeldsted restriction on the special fund
doctrine was more narrow and limited in 1938 than the
scope of the restriction now being advocated by Appellants.
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I t appears that the limited special fund doctrine
of the Fjeldsted case was overruled in Conder v. University of Utah, supra, in which this court upheld the issuance of bonds to be repaid from a special fund consisting of revenues from University of Utah dormitories
and land grant funds. Since proceeds from the land
grant funds had previously been deposited in the university general fund the pledge constituted a diversion
from the general fund. In Barlow v. Clearfield City
Corp., supra, the court applied the special fund theory
in upholding a contract between Clearfield City and
the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District and it
expressly noted it had refused to apply the Fjeldsted
restriction in the Conder case.
As early as 1937 it was reported that only South
Dakota and Utah adhered to the restricted special fund
doctrine. If there is anything remaining to the Fjeldsted restriction after Barlow, Conder and the two Utah
Power and Light Company cases, the instant case presents a suitable vehicle for the court to clarify this area
with an express repudiation of the Fjeldsted limitation.
Of course many Utah cases upholding the special fund
doctrine have not involved any diversion of monies from
the general fund. Freeman v. Stewart, supra; Tygesen
v. Magna Water Company, supra; and Patterick v.
Carbon County Water Conservancy District, supra.
These cases are appropriate and sufficient authority for
the determination of the instant case.
If the Fjeldsted holding has not been overruled,
it is not in point because the instant case involves no
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past or future diversion from the general funds of Salt
Lake City. Section 11-19-23.2 of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act, avoids the imposition of future
liability upon the City by requiring that "the bonds shall
be made payable, as to both principle and interest, solely from the income, proceeds, revenues and funds of
the Agency . . .". Section 11-19-25(5) (Utah Code Annotated, Interim Supp. 1974) of the Amendment to the
Utah Neighborhood Development Act expressly provides that redevelopment agency bonds are not a
general obligation or debt of the City.
Consistent with these statutory provisions the proposed bond resolution, an attachment to Exhibit 1, contemplates in Section 11 thereof the establishment of a
special fund consisting of tax increment revenues and
the net rental receipts from the Parking Facilities. Section 3 of the proposed resolution states that the bonds
and the interest thereon are not a debt of the City. To
avoid any possible misunderstanding and as an additional safeguard of the City's general fund, the proposed bond form as set out in Section 26 of the Bond
Resolution includes a legend notifying the bondholders
that the City and State cannot be liable for any debt
service relating to the bonds. Salt Lake City in its Ordinance of Ratification, Exhibit 2, protected the credit
of the City and avoided any contingent liability by including paragraph 4 which disclaims any responsibility
on the part of the City to pay any of the costs incurred
by the Agency in connection with the plan including
the repayment of any debt.
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I t is clear that bondholders must look only to the
special fund of the Redevelopment Agency for repayment of the principal and interest of the proposed
Bonds. There can be no diversion from the general funds
of the City for the benefit of the Agency or its creditors.
For a general summary of the numerous cases in support of the special fund doctrine, see Annot., 72 A.L.R.
687 (1931); Annot., 96 A.L.R. 1385 (1935); and
Annot., 146 A.L.R. 328 (1943).
A discussion of what was the restricted special
fund doctrine is not complete without a detailed consideration of Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321,
28 P.2d 161 (1933) a case which was heard at the same
time as the rehearing of Fjeldsted. Both the Fjeldsted
and Wadsworth opinions were issued by the court on
the same day. The water system in Santaquin had been
financed by general obligation bonds and water user
revenues. The bond issue had been retired so that all
of the net surplus of water revenues was being deposited
in the general fund of the City. The wood stave pipes
were leaking so badly that the City was losing fifty
percent of the water going into the distribution system.
I t proposed to issue $22,000.00 of water revenue bonds
to cover the replacement of the existing distribution
lines with cast iron pipes. Pursuant to statutory authorization (the Granger Act) the City attempted to impound and allocate to a special fund only the portion
of water revenues that the value of the improvements
bore to the old system. I t was acknowledged that unless
water rates were increased the improvements would
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generate no additional income because the system was
not being extended to facilitate hookups by new users.
The Wadsworth court was properly suspicious of
the Santaquin City Council's appraisal based on an engineering report which valued the improvements at
$47,950.00 and the existing system at $11,950.00. Without much difficulty the court uncovered two significant
errors in the appraisal formula and concluded that the
valuations were arbitrary and unreasonable. I t gave
helpful and specific instructions as to how the appraisals
could be corrected (28 P.2d at 174). I t then held,
"Where improvements or betterments are built into an
existing system or project, the revenues earned by such
improvements or betterments based on a proper appraisement of the old system and the improvements and
betterments, may be pledged to the payment of revenue
bonds as provided in the act. . . ." (28 P.2d at 175).
The court in Wadsworth seemed to anticipate the
concept upon which tax increment allocation is founded.
However, the Wadsworth case goes beyond the holding
of the trial court in the instant case. Unlike the City
of Santaquin we do not ask for judicial authorization
for a diversion of revenues from the general fund of the
City. As of the date of the equalized assessed valuation
immediately preceeding the initiation of the redevelopment plan, the City was receiving no tax revenues
based on improvements resulting from Agency efforts
in the project area. The City, the Appellants, other
city taxpayers similarly situated and other taxing entiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ties had and have no justifiable basis for expectations
of increased tax revenues from the blighted project
area. I t would be proper for the court to take judicial
notice that without action as proposed by the agency
the project area would continue its decline in assessed
valuation despite inflation, improvement of adjoining
areas and the influence of otherwise favorable economic
conditions, if any.
I t should be emphasized that the tax increment allocation will be available to the Agency only until it
has repaid loans, advances and any indebtedness or any
interest thereon. All monies received thereafter based
upon the increased tax increment allocation shall be
paid to the City and other taxing entities. Section 1119-29(1) (b), (Utah Code Annotated, Interim Supp.
1974). Rather than diverting any funds from the City
and other taxing entities, the Agency projects will ultimately becomes the sources of increased tax revenues to
entities which have not contributed to the cost of the
improvements.
Perhaps the basic concept of the special fund aspect
of the tax allocation financing was best summarized by
the California Court of Appeals for the Third District
when, under a specific constitutional provision, it considered the first tax increment appeal and held, "When
augmented property values produce taxes in excess of
the amount thus payable to taxing agencies, then . . .
the excess is to be allocated to a special fund of the re-
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development agency to pay principal and interest of
bonds. . . . After the bond obligation is paid off, the
separate allocation of excess revenues ceases, and all the
tax income goes to the taxing agencies". Redevelopment
Agency of the City of Sacramento v. Malachi, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 92, 95 (Cal.Ct.App. 1963).
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE PROPOSED REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY BONDS WILL NOT INVOLVE LENDING OF CREDIT BY THE
CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY OR THE
STATE OF UTAH.
The enabling tax increment statute (Utah Code
Annotated, Section 11-19-23.3, 25-35, Interim Supp.
1974), the proposed bond resolution (Exhibit 1), the
proposed bond form, and the City Ordinance of Ratification (Exhibit 2), all prohibit the use of credit of the
City for the repayment of the bonded indebtedness.
I n Part B of Point I I we have cited points and authorities in support of the determination of the trial court that
the proposed bond issue, and and any interest thereon,
can be repaid only from a special fund. The entire financial plan involves the allocation of the revenues from
identifiable increases in assessed valuation and from
parking facility revenues. These are the only revenue
sources which will supply the Special Fund. Bondhold-
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ers must look solely to the Special Fund for repayment
of their bonds and payment of accrued interest. Under
these circumstances there is no lending of credit contrary to Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution. (Findings of Fact 14 and 15, R. 95-96. Conclusions of Law 5, R. 99).
In 1968, this court resolved a lending of credit
question involving the issuance of industrial bonds by
Tooele County to finance the construction of a magnesium plant near the Great Salt Lake. After quoting
pertinent provisions of what is now Article VI, Section
29 of the Constitution, Justice Crockett in the primary
majority opinion made the following observation which
is also applicable to the proposed Agency project: " I t
seems evident that the legislature in framing this Act
and the defendants in planning this project have been
cognizant of the above constitutional interdiction and
have exercised care to avoid collision with it by safeguarding against any possibility that Tooele County or
its taxpayers will be charged with any obligation from
this contract." Allen v. Tooele County, 21 Utah 2d 383,
445 P.2d 994, 995 (1968).
Since Article VI, Section 29 prohibits the lending
of credit to any railroad, telegraph or other private individual or corporate enterprise or undertaking, the
points and authorities concerning the public purposes
of the proposed project as set out in Point I V should
also be considered in connection with the lending of
credit issue.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF THE PROPOSED PARKING FACILITY INVOLVES PUBLIC PURPOSES.
The primary thrust of Appellants' attack is aimed
at the parking facility. Indirectly this challenges the
entire plan for the project area because the anticipated
commercial development must be serviced by convenient, adequate parking. The trial court finding of public
purpose for the project was properly based on consideration of the overall objectives of the proposed integrated plan. Appellants ask that this viewpoint be narrowed to focus on the possible rental of some of the
stalls by adjoining businesses which will be benefitted
thereby. The trial court approach to this question is
consistent with the holdings of the U. S. Supreme Court
and the great weight of authority. After warning
against the fallacy of evaluating a project one building
at a time the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 and observed,
"The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced,
integrated plan could be developed for the region, including not only new homes but also schools, churches,
parks, streets and shopping centers. In this way it was
hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be controlled and the birth of future slums prevented". Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35, 75 St.Ct. 98, 99
L.Ed. 27 (1954).
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The Utah legislature, recognizing the public need
to arrest the expansion and infection of blight, enacted
similar enabling legislation known as the Utah Neighborhood Development Act. The Berman court placed
high credence in such legislative determinations of public need. "Subject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. I n such
cases the legislature not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served. . . .". (348 U.S.
at 32). For an interesting comparison of the costs of
blighted areas with the costs of comparable non-blighted
areas see, "Cost of Urban Blight", Urban Land, May
1946, as discussed in Brown, "Urban Redevelopment",
29 Boston Univ.L.Rev. 318 (1949).
But the sensitivity to conditions detrimental or inimical to the public health, safety or welfare did not
stop with the legislature. Pursuant to statutory guidelines both the Agency and the City surveyed and studied
the project areas in which the parking facility is to be
constructed. Several reports were generated as a result
of the studies including Exhibit 7 which indicates the
location of every structure in the project area with a
determination as to those which were deficient or substandard. The conclusion that the area was blighted is
clearly supportable. See, Annot., "What Constitutes
'Blighted Area' Within Urban Renewal and Redevelopment Statutes", 45 A.L.R. 3d 1096 (1972). The project area plan (Exhibit 4) entitled C.B.D. West Neighborhood Development Program, was then prepared deDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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scribing the project area and stating eight development
objectives all of which involve public purposes.
A public hearing was held February 4, 1971, to
review and consider the proposed plan. The minutes of
that hearing evidence an awareness of then existing public need (Exhibit 5). The City then adopted the C.B.D.
West Neighborhood Development Program by ordinance (Exhibit 3) making specific findings as to the
public nature of the purposes of the project plan.
The trial court took into account not only the determination of public purpose by the legislature as evidenced by the passage of the redevelopment legislation,
the conclusion of the City Commission after a public
hearing and the results of the surveys and studies of
the Agency, but also testimony taken at trial. Specific
portions of the pertinent testimony are discussed in
connection with the "state purpose doctrine" in Section
C of Point I and need not be repeated here. (R. 151152, 180-181). Under similar circumstances courts in
other jurisdictions have upheld findings of public purpose. Space will not permit citation of the numerous
cases in point, but the carefully written opinion and the
authorities referred to in Redevelopment Agency of
City and County of San Francisco v. Hayes, 122 Cal.
App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954) may be helpful to
the court. See also the more recent California cases of
Babcock v. Community Redevelopment Agency of the
City of Los Angeles, 306 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1957) and In
re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB, supra. The
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Idaho Supreme Court recognized the public purposes
of a redevelopment project in a condemnation case,
Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94
Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 (1972). Dozens of cases in
point are summarized in Section 4, Annot., "Statutes
Upheld As Serving Public Use, Urban Redevelopment
Laws", 44 A.L.R.2d 1414, 1420-1426 (1955). This
annotation together with the Later Case Service, for
volume 44 A.L.R.2d, indicate the Supreme Courts in
the following jurisdictions on one or more occasions
have found public purpose or public use in challenged
redevelopment projects: United States, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin. See also, Mandelker, "Public Purpose in Urban Redevelopment," 28 Tulane LMev. 96 (1953).
So lopsided is the weight if authority in favor of
urban redevelopment laws that the A.L.R. editor could
observe as of the time of writing, "In two instances, the
purposes permitted to be served by the redevelopment
acts in question have been held not to constitute public
uses, and the statutes have been held invalid on that
ground", Annot., 44 A.L.R. 2d at 1426 (1955). The
cases then cited are the only redevelopment cases appearing in Appellants' brief concerning the question of
public purpose, Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.
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2d 663 (Fla. 1952) and Housing Authority v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E. 2d 891 (1953). Both of these
cases turned on the use of the power of eminent domain,
an issue which is not before this court. I n any event
neither case presently represents the law of its respective state. After the decision in Johnson, Georgia
amended the eminent domain article of its constitution.
Thereafter the Georgia court has consistently upheld
findings by municipalities of public purposes for redevelopment projects. Bailey v. Housing Authority, 214
Ga. 790, 107 S.E.2d 812 (1959); Allen v. City Council of Augusta, 215 Ga. 778, 113 S.E.2d 621 (1960)
and Freedman v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, 108 Ga. App. 418, 136 S.E.2d 544 (1963). The
holding of the Florida court in the Adams case was
modified or overruled in Grubstein v. Urban Renewal
Agency of City of Tampa, 115 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1959)
and definitely overruled in State v. County of Dade,
210 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1968), a case involving issuance
of bonds for a parking facility, restaurant and pilot
training structure at the municipal airport.
We are unable to see the relevance of the Washington case relied upon so heavily by Appellants, Hogue v.
Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
Hogue is an industrial development eminent domain
case involving the attempted condemnation of parcels
of 720 farms and residential lots involving approximately 2,175 acres all of which were situated outside the
limits of the City of Seattle. The purpose of the acquisition by the Port authority was to convert the lands
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to industrial sites for resale to private businesses and
industries to be serviced by a navigable waterway. From
undispuated evidence the court expressly found the
"lands are not congested urban lands, nor unoccupied
lands, nor tide lands, nor wild, undeveloped lands,
rather, they are well-developed agriculture and residential lands situated in King County outside the City
limits of Seattle". Three of the Hague court justices
dissented primarily on the grounds that it should not
be necessary to show the lands were blighted or marginal
so long as the ultimate purposes involved a public use.
I t should not be inferred from the Hague case that
the Washington Supreme Court would be unable to
find public purpose in the proposed redevelopment plan
now before this court. The cases are factually distinguishable and the Washington court has taken occasion
to distinguish the Hogue decision from subsequent
urban redevelopment cases. Miller v. City of Tacoma,
61 Wash. 2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963). The Miller
opinion refers to footnotes in an appendix in which
thirty-nine (39) "leading" cases from thirty-two (32)
states are set out as authority for the proposition that
urban renewal laws involve public purposes. Miller was
then followed by the Washington court in Edwards v.
City Council of City of Seattle, 3 Wash. App. 665, 479
P.2d 120 (1970) and Petition of Port of Seattle in re
Hove v. Port of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 392, 495 P.2d
327 (1972).
At the trial plaintiffs on direct examination asked
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many questions regarding the classification of those who
would be using the proposed parking facility. If the
purpose of this line of questioning was to demonstrate
the predominance of private benefits, it was not successful. Private developers could be expected to furnish no
more than the number of parking stalls required by applicable zoning laws for their particular development.
This would be hopelessly inadequate to service increasing public need and to replace the parking spaces which
previously existed within the area. (R. 147-149). Continuous guaranteed use of some of the proposed 1300
available stalls by adjoining businesses contributes to
the economic feasibility of the proposed project. These
companies will not receive preferential rates. (R. 169170). W e fail to see any improper private benefit in
connection with the proposed project.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD
THAT THE ALLOCATION OF TAXES FOR
REDEVELOPMENT PURPOSES AND THE
USE OF THESE AND OTHER FUNDS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE REDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DOES NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Section 5 of Article X I I I of the Utah Constitution on one hand prohibits the legislature from imposing taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town or
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other municipal corporation and on the other hand
authorizes the legislature by law to vest in the corporate
authorities of county, city, town or other municipal corporations, the power to assess and collect taxes for all
purposes of such corporations. The allocation of revenues from the increased increment of assessed valuation resulting after a redevelopment project is initiated
does not involve the imposition of any tax. The Redevelopment Agency is not empowered to impose a tax
and taxing entities are not required or authorized to increase a tax levy for redevelopment purposes. Use of
tax increment financing cannot increase taxes levied by
any or all of the taxing entities because the standard
mill levy is merely applied to the increment of increased
assessed valuation as well as to the base assesed valuation and each taxing entity receives no less than what
it would have received were it not for the redevelopment
project.
The Utah Neighborheed Development Act merely
enables local government entities to create redevelopment agencies in a manner which is entirely compatible
with the constitutional authorization of Section 5 under
which the legislature may vest in designated corporate
authorities the power to assess and collect taxes for
proper purposes. This court defined "for all purposes
of such corporations" as being synonymous with "public
purposes" in Denver & B. G. R. Co. v. Grand County,
51 Utah 294, 170, P . 74, 76, 3 A.L.R. 1224 (1917).
Suitable public purpose was found to support the conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stitutionality of a statute requiring Salt Lake County
to construct a juvenile detention home. In Salt Lake
County v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 134 P . 560
(1913) this court quoted with approval f r o m
a Missouri decision holding . . . "that the legislature,
in case of its judgment the public good or welfare requires it, may call upon counties or cities as state agencies to assist the state in paying the expenses incurred
for the public good." (134 P . at 563).
State v. Stcmdford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P . 1061
(1901) on which Appellants rely is not in point. That
case involved a statute establishing a state board of
horticulture and requiring counties to select fruit tree
inspectors from names submitted by the state board, to
hire the inspectors thus designated at a rate of compensation and for a term set by the state and to pay the
inspectors from county funds. A majority of the court
found this program to be violative of Section 5 of Article X I I I and other constitutional provisions. I t rejected an argument that the inspectors were county
authorities. In doing so it provided a useful definition
by stating, "By the term 'corporate authorities' must
be intended those municipal officers who are either directly elected by the population to be taxed or appointed
in some mode to which they have given their assent."
(66 P . at 1063). In contrast to the facts of Standford,
the Redevelopment Agency is not supervised by a state
agency or board, the state has nothing to do with the
hiring and compensation of Agency employees and City
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funds canont be used at the direction of the state for redevelopment purposes.
To avoid unnecessary repetition of points and
authorities, Respondents refer the court to other pertinent sections of this brief including Section A of Point I
concerning the voluntary creation of the Agency by
the City; Section B of Point I concerning the administration of the Agency by the Board of Commissioners
of the City; Section B of Point I I concerning repayment of the redevelopment bonds from a special fund;
and Point I V concerning the public purposes of the
proposed project.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
ITS DETERMINATION THAT BUDGETARY LAWS REGULATING CITIES ARE
NOT APPLICABLE TO THE REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY.
The Agency is not a city of the first, second or
third class as defined in the Uniform Municipal Fiscal
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 1010-23 to 10-10-75 (1973). Nor is the Agency a county,
town or other municipal corporation. Because of its purposes, its legal form, and its method of operation the
Agency is a quasi-municipal corporation. Please see
Section A of Point I I and the authorities therein cited
for a more complete discussion of the legal nature of the
Agency.
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POINT VII.
THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF TAXES
USING AN ASSESSED VALUATION BASE
DETERMINED IN 1970 IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF A STATUTE WHERE THE
MILL LEVY TO BE APPLIED TO THE VALUATION BASE IS PROSPECTIVE.
I n its Findings of Fact number 16 (R. 96) the
trial court determined that the last equalized assessment
roll available as of the February 11, 1971, the date
of adoption of the Redevelopment Agency plan,
utilized valuations assessed for the year 1970. Since
there is no attempt under the statutory formula to allocate revenues from past mill levies, the trial court also
held in its Conclusions of Law that the allocation of
future taxes under the tax increment formula does not
constitute a retroactive application of the Utah Neighborhood Development Act. (Conclusions of Law 9, R.
99). The distinction between the mill levy and the
arithmetic formula is valid and significant because it is
the mill levy which requires affirmative action of the
respective taxing entities. Whether the date of adoption
of the original plan or the date of adoption of the
amendment to the plan is used, in either case the base
for tax increment purposes must be the last equalized
assessment roll prior to one or the other of those dates.
I t will not be possible to use some future equalized assessment roll. Thus we fail to see how one date may be
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retroactive and the other date not. Since retroactivity
is determined by the date of the mill levy it is apparent
that neither of the alternatives involves a retroactive
application of the statute.
The statutes being challenged do not impose criminal sanctions, so constitutional prohibitions against ex
post facto laws do not apply, 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law (Retrospective Legislation), §§ 395-410
(1964). By contrast, civil statutes may be applied retroactively or be retrospective in nature without violating
state or federal constitutional provisions unless there
is a resulting impairment of vested rights. 16 Am. Jur.
2d, Constitutional Law (Other Retrospective Laws),
§§ 413-418 (1964). Appellants acknowledge there is no
impairment of property rights or other vested rights.
The statutes in question are not retrospective in nature,
nor do the proposals involve retroactive application, but
even if such were not the case, objections on constitutional grounds should not obtain.
Respondents respectfully suggest that the earlier
equalized assessment roll is the appropriate base for
the tax increment calculation even though it is to the
advantage of the Agency to use the more recent lower
assessed valuation base. (See Exhibit 18 and the computations at the top of page 40 of Appellants' brief).
This position is supported by a case in point, Redevelopment Agency of the City and County of San FranCisco v. Cooper, 72 Cal. Rptr. 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
The court there dealt with both the adoption of the plan
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and a subsequent amendment to that plan. I t determined
that the appropriate assessed valuation base was the
one immediately prior to the adoption of the plan.
Whether or not this learned court agrees with the trial
court and the Cooper decision as to the date of equalized assessed valuation to be used, it is of utmost importance that the prospective nature of the statutory
formula as applied to future levies of taxes be acknowledged.
POINT VIII.
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MEET
THE BURDEN OF OVERCOMING A PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT AND THE
VALIDITY AND CORRECTNESS OF THE
TRIAL COURT HOLDING.
There is a presumption of statutory validity and
constitutionality and one who questions it has the burden of convincing the court of the unconstitutionality
of the statute being challenged. 16 C. J.S., Constitutional
Law, § 99 (1956). In Branch v. Salt Lake County
Service Area No. 2, supra, this court quoted with approval the following:
"In determining constitutionality, statutes
are presumed to be constitutional until the
contrary is clearly shown. I t is only when
statutes manifestly infringe upon some constitutional provision that they can be declared
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void. Every reasonable presumption must be
indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of constitutionality." Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939 at
943 (1943) and the numerous previous cases
therein cited. (460 P.2d at 815).
The trial court viewed extensive documentary evidence and considered the testimony of witnesses before
finding for Respondents. The judgment predominantly involved a determination of factual issues on questions of public purpose and state purpose. Factual findings were also required in connection with some of the
other issues involved in this case. There is a presumption
that the holding of the trial court is valid and correct.
. . . "[Ejvery reasonable intendment ought to be indulged in favor of the validity and correctness of the
judgment under review, and it will not be disturbed unless the Appellant meets his burden of affirmatively
showing error." Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Compcmy, 3 Utah 2d 274, 282 P.2d 335, 337 (1955); McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468, 469
(1952).
CONCLUSION
The proposed project will make possible improvements and developments having market values of an
estimated $32,000,000.00 to approximately $49,000,000.00. The resulting increase in assessed valuation will not require any increase in the mill levy nor
any increased burden to the taxpayers. The statutory
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authorization for this opportunity to meet some urgent
public needs is provided in the basic Utah Neighborhood Development Act and its more recent amendments
authorizing allocation of taxes imposed in increments
of increased assessed valuation. Other states have successfully demonstrated that this method of municipal
finance effectively enables a redevelopment project to
underwrite on its own the cost of eliminating blight
while simultaneously strengthening municipal core
areas to the benefit of both city and state.
In summarizing the reply of Respondents to the
numerous and sometimes inconsistent positions taken
by Appellants, we emphasize that there is no unlawful
delegation from the legislature to the Redevelopment
Agency because the Agency was created by the voluntary exercise of local option by Salt Lake City. Also
the administrative head of the Agency is a Board of
Commissioners who serve as the elected members of the
Board of Commissioners of the City.
If, contrary to the holding of the trial court and
the position of Respondents, some form of delegation
is found to be involved in connection with the creation
and operation of the Agency, then such delegation is
not unconstitutional because the Agency is not a special
commission, private corporation or association. I t is a
quasi-municipal corporation which does not manage,
supervise or interfere with any municipal function. The
existence of similar quasi-municipal corporations has
long been acknowledged by this court. Or, in the alterDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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native, the purposes and objectives of the Agency have
statewide impact so as to justify the attention of the
state legislature. A legislative delegation is not prohibited where there is a showing of state purpose.
The proposed Redevelopment Agency Bonds will
not constitute a debt of the City because the Agency is
a special district and not a department, division or subdivision of the City. Even if the Agency were deemed
to be a department of the City the proposed bonds
would not constitute a debt of the City because they are
to be repaid from a special fund comprised of revenues
to be received from the operation of the proposed parking facility together with those generated by an allocation of the increment of increased assessed valuation
experienced in the redevelopment project area after
adoption of the project plan for redevelopment. Consistent with the restrictions imposed by law and contractual provisions upon the Agency in connection with
the repayment of the proposed bonds, potential bondholders will be put on notice that they can look only to
the revenue sources set out above for repayment of the
bonds. Under these circumstances the bonds cannot become a general obligation of the City, County or any
other taxing entity and the mill levy may not be increased in order to pay principal or interest on the
bonds. Thus there is no lending of the credit of the
City, County or any other taxing entity to the Agency
or any private entity.
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The purposes of redevelopment p r o j e c t s
similar to the one before the court have been held to
involve public purposes rather than private benefits by
the U. S. Supreme Court and by the courts of last resort in numerous other jurisdictions. Any private benefit or detriment is inconsequential compared with the
overall objectives of the plan. The parking facility is an
essential part of the overall development of the two
block project area in central Salt Lake City.
The allocation of taxes based on a defined increment of assessed valuation does not amount to the imposition of a tax and Respondents have demonstrated
that the proposed project will not result in any direct
or indirect tax burden. I n fact, after the temporary
allocation of the tax increment, the increased assessed
valuation will then be available to other taxing entities
even though they did not participate by sharing any of
the costs of the improvements resulting from the proposed development. In addition it should be clear that
the Agency is not a city and therefore it is not subject
to budgetary laws regulating cities. I t is equally clear
that the allocation of a future tax is not a retroactive
application of a statute even though it is necessary to
use a valuation base which precedes redevelopment activity.
For the foregoing reasons we urge that the decision of the trial court, the validity of the Utah NeighDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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borhood Development Act and the legality of the
proposed issue of parking revenue and tax allocation
bonds be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG, POELMAN & FOX
Richard S. Fox
William D.Oswald
Attorneys for DefendmtsBespondents
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